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This thesis seeks to explain the reoccurring electoral success of Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez in the context of Chávez’s exposure in the media, specifically, 
by evaluating his weekly show, Aló Presidente, alongside public opinion data to further 
develop our understanding of the Bolivarian Revolution and Socialismo del Siglo XXI 
(21st Century Socialism). Public opinion data from international sources is utilized 
alongside regional and local surveys to account for any polarization in the reporting by 
data firms that may have been reflected in the data, otherwise. While the Constitución 
Bolivariana of 1999 offered an egalitarian, liberal-progressive construction on paper, it 
also broadly trengthened the Executive, which President Chávez has utilized in 
undercutting liberal  democracy, funding communal programs at the expense of local 
government, aiding his party’s clientilistic network, and ultimately consolidating 
personal political power. Comparing the stated ideals of 21st Century Socialism from the 
coded Aló Presidente transcripts with popular opinion data concerning the president’s 





Venezuelans on the necessity of the Bolivarian Missions programs, which may be a 
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AD     Acción Democrática – Democratic Action Party 
ALBA    La Alternativa Bolivariana Para las Américas - Bolivarian 
Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Aló Presidente   Hello President 
Asamblea Nacional   National Assembly 
Chavistas    Supporters of President Hugo Chávez 
Comandante    Commander 
COPEI    Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela– Social Christian 
Party of Venezuela 
FTAA     Free Trade Area of the Americas 
Jefe del Estado   Head of State 
LAPOP    The Latin American Public Opinion Project 
Latifundios    Large landed estate holders 
Los barrios    The neighborhoods 
Punto Fijo    The Pact at Punto Fijo 
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Venezuela has undergone profound political, social, and economic change over the past 
decade. The Bolivarian Revolution, led by President Hugo Chávez Frías, has had major 
influence on all aspects of Venezuelan society. Massive state-directed, social spending 
programs (los Misiones), have galvanized support for the socialist project amongst 
populists and Venezuelans from the barrios, while divisive rhetoric from the President and 
attacks on the private sector in the form of nationalizations and expropriations have 
polarized Venezuelan politics. Mr. Chávez’s loquacious style and unapologetic bashing of 
the United States have furthered the political chasm between chavistas and antichavistas 
and helped President Chávez to attract a large following of support from populist leftists 
around the world, while also attracting frequent criticism from western governments and 
defenders of the liberal democratic tradition. President Hugo Chávez, having embraced 
visual and social media outlets (television, radio, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) as a way of 
conveying his message to the masses has become arguably one of the most publically 
exposed jefes del estado in the world. This thesis seeks to explain the reoccurring electoral 
success of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in the context of Chávez’s exposure in the 
media, specifically, by evaluating his weekly show, Aló Presidente. Analysis of his  
______________ 






television program alongside economic and public opinion data will be utilized to further 
develop our understanding of the Bolivarian Revolution and, specifically, Socialismo del 
Siglo XXI (21st Century Socialism). 
 
The first mention by President Chávez of Socialismo del Siglo XXI occurs on January 30, 
2005 at the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Wilpert 2009). Thus, this 
thesis will tend to focus on the recent past and not dwell on pre-Chávez years, as an 
extensive literature exists surrounding the faults and decay of the two-party system leading 
up to the 1999 election of Hugo Chávez.1 In this paper, I will differentiate and compare the 
philosophy of Socialismo del Siglo XXI, based on the political and philosophical ideals of 
Venezuela’s charismatic leader, with the actual enactment of social programs and socio-
political change that Venezuela is currently undergoing. In order to better our 
understanding of the idealized philosophy of the Bolivarian project and Socialismo del 
Siglo XXI, outside sources will be utilized in our opening discussion of defining the 
Venezuelan socialist project. The definition of Socialismo del Siglo XXI from these 
secondary sources will then be compared to statements made by President Chávez in his 
Aló Presidente television program coded from Aló Presidente transcripts. Once this 
analysis has established a backdrop for the enactment of social spending programs 
embarked upon by the Chávez government, Aló Presidente transcripts are analyzed to 
assess the major policy areas that Mr. Chávez seeks to highlight in his weekly dialogue 
with the Venezuelan citizenry. Finally, socio-economic and public opinion data from 
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 See Tulchin and Bland (1993); Coppedge (1994, 1996); McCoy and Smith (1995); Weyland (1998); McCoy 





international and regional sources will be used to compare the rhetoric with program 
implementation. By juxtaposing data from Aló Presidente with an array of public opinion 
data, we gain a better understanding for the relative successes and failures of the Chávez 
administration in marketing government led initiatives. Overall, I find that Chávez is 
succeeding in selling Venezuelans on the necessity of the Bolivarian Missions programs, 
which may be a driving factor in his successes at the polls. The main contribution of this 
thesis is to answer how President Hugo Chávez attempts to reeducate Venezuelans in the 
idealized 21st Century Socialism ideology vis-a-vi his weekly talk show, Aló Presidente 
and how effective he has been in these attempts. 
 
I have chosen to analyze Aló Presidente though Chávez interacts with the Venezuelan 
citizenry in many ways, whether through social media (Twitter @chavezcandanga or 
Facebook), radio, or periodicals, due to the wide availability of television programming in 
Venezuela and because of the editorial publicity that the weekly show generates. The 
show, which averages airtime of ~6.22 hours (McCoy 2011) is unlikely to draw a weekly 
fully-attuned audience, with the exception of the most loyal chavistas. This does not 
diminish the valuable insight into the Bolivarian project that we shall gain by exploring the 
policy initiatives and social, economic, and political projects that tend to pique Chávez’s 
interest and dominate the discussion on the program. Local, regional, and international 
news and social media outlets monitor information and rhetoric from the show and act as 
interlocutors between Chávez and the Venezuelan people through the program 





program to social and official media outlets, then makes our analyses of the show pertinent 
if we wish to better our understanding of the socialist project that Chávez is attempting to 
construct in Venezuela. In particular, our analyses of Aló Presidente aids in our 
understanding of how Chavez is presenting his program directly to Venezuelans. 
 
Brief synopsis of pre-Chávez era: end of partyocracy 
 
The ascendancy of Hugo Chávez to the Venezuelan presidency is as much attributable to 
the chaotic, failed political environment in which he became a political figure, as to the 
charisma of el presidente, himself. This paper will not provide an in-depth discussion and 
analysis of Venezuelan politics prior to the first election of Hugo Chávez in 1999. An 
abundance of research exists concerning the creation of the democratic regime following 
Punto Fijo in 1958, the establishment of a two-party system dominated by Acción 
Democrática (AD) and Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela (COPEI), the role of 
petroleum funds and pacts in stabilizing the democratic regime, and the reasons why those 
established parties lost voter support.2   Yet, an understanding of Venezuela’s history and 
the events surrounding the rise to predominance of Hugo Chávez in Venezuelan politics is 
necessary in order to understand the problems that the country and the socialist project face 
today. 
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 See Tulchin, Joseph and Bland, Gary (1993); Coppedge, Michael (1994); McCoy, Jennifer and Smither, 
William C. (1995); Coppedge, Michael (1996); Weyland, Kurt (1998); Crisp, Brian (1998); McCoy, Jennifer 





Prior to the last decade of the twentieth century, the Venezuelan political landscape was 
controlled by the clientilistic interests of two parties. This two-party political system was 
“built on a pact among members of the elite, [whereby] the dominant political parties 
[were] the principal actors” (Tulchin and Bland 1993, p 2). The status quo perpetuated by 
the party system was maintained through peaceful transference of power between AD and 
COPEI from 1958 until the crumbling of the old system and the accession to power of Mr. 
Chávez through democratic means. The failed clientilistic network, corruption embodied 
by the entrenched bureaucratic interests, and unpopular neo-liberal policies of the late 
1980’s and 1990’s instigated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and pursued by 
both AD’s and COPEI’s  presidential administrations directly led to the disillusionment of 
the Venezuelan populace. This disillusionment with politics set the stage for the attempted 
military coup of 1992, orchestrated by Hugo Chávez and other military leaders from the 
younger generation of the officer corps (Guevara 2005). 
 
With nearly ninety percent of the population citing corruption as a “very serious” problem 
confronting Venezuelan democracy in 1998 (Latinobarometro 1998a)3 and only thirty-
eight percent of the population having a positive outlook on the economic future of the 
country in the late nineties (Latinobarometro 1998b)4, the stage was set for a newly 
energizing force to sweep through the Venezuelan political landscape. The charismatic 
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 Latinobarometro 1998a “Cuán serio es el problema de corrupción hoy en el país?” 
4
 Latinobarometro 1998b “¿Y en los próximos doce meses cree Ud. que, en general, la situación económica 





leader that looked to fill the void left by the failed party-state was Comandante Hugo 
Chávez. 
 
The initial philosophizing and government expenditures that occurred under the direction 
of Hugo Chávez following his inauguration on February 2, 1999 were not collectively 
labeled as a socialist campaign.  Rather, the current socialist project, affectionately known 
by chavistas as Socialismo del Siglo XXI, which has come to dominate the rhetoric of the 
President and has greatly influenced the development of social programs and social 
spending in Venezuela grew out of an affinity for a proposed ‘Third Way’ of development 
that was initially supported by the President following his release from prison in 1994 
(Padgett 2006). The Third Way combined a mixed-capitalist system with a Rousseauian 
view of government as interlocutor between the state and sovereignty comprised of the 
entire people. Today, the Rousseauian view of government responsibility remains 
noticeable in the state’s role in the socialist project, however, the capitalism from the 20
th 
century has been rhetorically discredited by the President, with projected growth now 
derived mainly from government spending, nationalized firms, and state-dominated 
cooperatives. 
 
Understanding the philosophy: socialismo del Siglo XXI 
 
Before we can begin to understand the social and political transformations occurring in 





Chávez in undertaking this socialist project. Through a wealth of available interviews, 
presidential speeches, government propaganda, and hours of coded Aló Presidente 
transcripts, I will identify the overarching characteristics of the idealized version of 
Socialismo del Siglo XXI along with the philosophical beliefs of the Venezuelan president, 
Hugo Chávez Frías. Later, this will be compared with the actual implementation of 21st 
Century Socialism projects in order to analyze the extent to which Chavez’s government 
has delivered tangible benefits to Venezuelans that they might expect based on the 
philosophy of 21st Century Socialism 
 
On January 30, 2005 when President Chávez first announced his belief that “it is necessary 
to transcend capitalism…through socialism, true socialism, with equality and justice,” at 
the World Social Forum (Sojo 2005), the framework had been set for the Bolivarian 
Revolution to embark on a unique socialist project for the new millennium. The remainder 












alluding to his distrust of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), perceived failures 
of the capitalist system, and his religious underpinnings in Christ as “one of the greatest 
anti-imperialist fighters, the redeemers of the poor, and one of the greatest revolutionaries 
in the history of the world” (Sojo 2005). This romanticized religious allusion highlights the 
grandiose thinking of Hugo Chávez and Chavez’s view of himself as a revolutionary in the 
context of a greater socialist transformation that has been passed down since the coming of 
Christ (Sojo 2005). Vitriolic castigation of western capitalist imperialism, praise for the 
Cuban administration, and reverence for the mythicized figure of Simón Bolívar 
throughout the speech all give clues to the ideology of Socialismo del Siglo XXI through 
the eyes of Hugo Chávez. Figure 1 provides an overview of the disparate parts that 





Figure 1: Overarching Ideas Constituting 21
st
 Century Socialism 
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Characteristics of Socialismo del Siglo XXI: 
- constant threat of western imperialism5 
- distinctively Venezuelan in nature 
- active democratic participation 
- social inclusion 
- economic redistribution 
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 This threat of western imperialism that Chávez is fond of speaking about is seen as much as an economic 





Independence from el diablo6 and the threat of western imperialism 
 
The idea of western imperialism and capitalism as sources for the inequalities found within 
Venezuelan society today has been a main argument for the social activism of the Chávez 
administration.  In fact, the nuanced attacks on western society have grown increasingly 
more vituperative over the years as the successes of the Bolivarian project have become 
increasingly tied with the success/failures of the Bolivarian President. Thus, over time, 
Chávez’s need for a scapegoat has grown as the obstacles facing the Bolivarian Revolution 
have exposed its shortcomings (Manwaring 2006). Failures to quell violence, eradicate 
broad wealth disparity (Kozloff 2006), and rescue Venezuela from the entrenched 
“corruptocracia” (as Chávez is wont to call the failed bureaucratic state of the Punto Fijo 
regime) have left the government in need of an antagonist. In order to maintain the 
credibility of the Bolivarian project, the urgency with which social programs need to be 
enacted, and the need for Hugo Chávez to remain as president, the Bolivarian President 
often vilifies the latifundios and US capitalist system as an imminent threat to Venezuela’s 
sovereign right to guaranteeing its citizens “a better life” (Rojas 2011). 
 
Endogenous development and new international partners 
 
In an attempt to extricate Venezuela from the globalized western capitalist system that has 
come to dominate the international economy, a main pillar of Socialismo del Siglo XXI is 
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the promotion of endogenous development. Tying in to the tenant of independence from 
western influence, the idea of endogenous development is meant to shun reliance on 
competitively advanced western firms by allocating resources towards internally directed 
development, taking into consideration the human element of production.  Adherence to 
this idea has led to state-directed cooperatives and the takeover of large latifundios 
throughout the country (Economist 2005b). 
 
Equally important to promoting endogenous growth is the idea of creating international 
partnerships without reliance on western governments. Hugo Chávez has increasingly 
turned to unorthodox partnerships with countries like Iran, Russia, and China to fund and 
supply public works programs in Venezuela. Most importantly, la Alternativa Bolivariana 
Para las Américas (ALBA), the alternative international system to the US backed Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), was created as a forum for “regional integration that 
transcends the prerogatives of the transnational corporations” (Arreaza 2004). In effect, 
ALBA is meant as an alternate free trade area that is focused on regional growth rather 






Popular power of participatory democracy 
 
“What is the core, what is the essence of the proposal that I am making to the Venezuelan 
people? – Popular Power.”7 Hugo Chávez Frías August 26, 2007 (Aló Presidente 291) 
 
Arguably, the most important aspect of 21st Century Socialism is the idea of state 
legitimacy rising from the active, popular participation of the Venezuelan people. In an 
attempt to diminish the importance of local governance, which Chávez views as an 
extension of liberal democracy and incompatible with the populist nature of the Bolivarian 
project, semi-autonomous consejos comunales8 have been set-up throughout the country. 
These communal counsels have direct access to funding, can propose project spending, and 
can even implement projects locally without contracting out work. 
 
In an attempt to create a truly bottom-up revolution, these councils allow for the direct 
involvement of the Venezuelan citizenry in community decision making, with the goal of 
fostering personal investment by the citizenry in their neighborhoods.  These communal 
councils are distinct from local government, however, and act as a mechanism whereby 
community activists can surpass elected local officials by applying directly to the national 
government for project funding, which is why critics of these councils argue that 
communal council governance has allowed for Chávez to entrench his interests in local 
level politics by surpassing democratically elected members of government. 
                                                 
7
 “¿Cuál es la medulla, cuál es la esencia de la propuesta que hago al pueblo venezolano? El Poder Popular.” 
8







Land Reform has been crucial to the implementation of 21st Century Socialism. 
Specifically, the appropriation and allocation of latifundios9 to government-led 
cooperatives and locally run enterprises has complemented the idea that Venezuelan land 
belongs in the hands of Venezuelans (Wilpert 2006: 249). To justify the appropriation of 
latifundio lands, the Oligarchy is discredited as not being true Venezuelans but rather in a 
constant state of war with the will of the Venezuelan people. In the opening dialogue of 
episode 364 of Aló Presidente on October 3, 2010, Chávez makes clear that the fight to 
create a new economic model is the same fight to reincorporate latifundio lands back into 
the hands of Venezuelans.  In citing the Federalist Venezuelan soldier Ezequiel Zamora10, 
Chávez notes in the same episode that only by “liberating the land from the hands of the 





The Chávez government has embarked upon massive cooperative and co-management 
implementation, with government sponsored cooperatives rising in Venezuela “from about 
800 in 1998 to over 100,000 in 2005” (Wilpert 2006: 2). This spike in cooperatives 
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 Latifundios meaning large tracts of land. Characteristically, these vast lands are owned by one or a small 
group of person(s), often considered to be elitists by chavistas. 
10Ezequiel Zamora was a Venezuelan soldier and leader of the Federalists in the Federal War (Guerra 





employed nearly 1.5 million Venezuelans in 2005, nearly 10% of Venezuela’s adult 
population (National Superintendency of Cooperatives 2005).  However, with most 
business orders and funding coming directly from the coffers of the national government, 
and most government revenues in the form of petrodollars11, the sustainability of these 
programs has been questioned; especially, following the global recession and subsequent 




The idea of a strong centralized government with expansive powers consolidated in the 
hands of the Executive branch is considered imperative to the success of the Bolivarian 
project. The bottom-up socialist revolution that Chávez’s Socialismo del Siglo XXI is 
meant to inspire is only possible with an effective leader with unchecked powers to 
introduce and implement legislation. Legislative checks and balances are viewed as a 
hindrance to the effective implementation of government-led initiatives. Chavistas regard 
the Asamblea Nacional as only a legitimizing mechanism for Government policy and as 
such, a forum of incorporation for Opposition critique. Indeed, the PSUV12 majority in the 
legislature throughout Chávez’s tenure has acted as little more than a rubber stamp in the 
passing of the Government’s major policy initiatives (Halling 2008: 2); even extending 
executive emergency powers to the office of the President upon request from the 
Executive.  
                                                 
11
 Petrodollars referring to revenues earned through the sale of petroleum. 
12





The idea of consolidated central power and the Legislature as a legitimizing mechanism for 
Government policy is not unique to the Chávez regime or the Bolivarian project, however. 
Indeed, historically weak legislatures have been characteristic of many countries 
throughout Latin America. Under the AD and COPEI administrations of the latter half of 
the twentieth century, the legislature acted as a forum for oppositional discontent and 






ALÓ PRESIDENTE DATA AND ANALYSIS 
To assess how President Chávez attempts to convey his philosophy to the people of 
Venezuela, I coded the introductory portion of Aló Presidente shows from September 10, 
2006 until November 14, 2010.  This period begins prior to the 2006 election for the 
National Assembly and continues through ~80 episodes until the 2010 legislative elections.  
Coding was carried out by using transcripts of the program available at 
http://www.alopresidente.gob.ve.  By covering this broad time period, we are better able to 
assess the policy areas that Chávez has conscientiously decided to discuss and educate the 
Venezuelan people about through his public exposure in the media. Television media 
remains an important line of communication for Venezuelans, with nearly 66% of 
Venezuelans watching news programming every day and a cumulative 81% of 
Venezuelans receiving their news from television programming at least once a week in 
2007.13 These percentages slightly increase to 67% and 83%, respectively, of Venezuelans 
self-reporting watching the news at least one or more times per week in 2008.14 Aló 
Presidente remains one of the oldest direct lines of communication between el Palacio de 
Miraflores15 and the Venezuelan citizenry.  
 
                                                 
13
 LAPOP Veneuzela 2007: 18. Special Topics. (a2) Con qué frecuencia mira noticias en la TV... 
14
 LAPOP Venezuela 2008: 18. Special Topics (a2) Mira noticias en la TV 
15





The show began as a weekly, interactive radio forum to promote dialogue between the 
President and the people on May 23, 1999 and has evolved over time into the current 
quasi-structured television program that remains on air today. Average air time for Aló 
Presidente is ~6.22 hours, which diminishes the feasibility of coding each episode in its 
entirety. Thus, to make it possible to analyze shows covering several years, I coded the 
beginning ~15 minutes of each transcript.16 By coding the first fifteen minutes, ample time 
was afforded Mr. Chávez to ‘set the stage’ of the day’s program, and open the discussion 
about the major policy areas that he meant to discuss that day. 
 
Policy areas covered as major show themes in Aló  
 
Table 1 summarizes the major public policy areas most often addressed by President 
Chávez when communicating through his weekly television show, Aló Presidente, to the 
Venezuelan citizenry.  These public policy areas are paramount to our analysis of the 
effectiveness of social spending programs presented later in Section G. Comparative 
Analysis: Aló Presidente y Los Misiones. Due to the unpredictability and often unscripted 
nature of the show, Chávez often freely discusses his current thoughts and feelings. It is 
common for fleeting thoughts of the president to be openly expressed, but such offhanded 
comments are not counted in this table alongside the major themes of each show which 
dominate that day’s program discussion. 
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 In order to ascertain how many pages equated to fifteen minutes, the first five show transcripts were 






 The  Aló Presidente transcripts that I utilize are drawn from 
http://www.alopresidente.gob.ve. The data consist of available transcripts beginning with 
the final show three months prior to the 2006 Presidential elections until one month 
following the 2010 National Assembly elections. I expect, Chávez will want to grab the 
attention of the audience within the opening of every episode of Aló Presidente, therefore I 
read and coded each transcript until the approximately fifteenth minute of the program. 
 I also collected data about statements that fit in a “philosophy education” category. Those 
data are examined in in greater detail in Section H but for now it is important to note that 
President Chávez attempts to reeducate the populace in personal Bolivarian ideology in 
nearly every episode. This socialization of the Venezuelan populace into Chávez social 





Table 1: Major themes discussed in the opening segment of Aló Presidente  
 
Policy Areas     2006* 2007  2008** 2009  2010 
 
Education                  1/1               5/25                4/14                2/13                 2/21 
       100%           20.0%  28.6%            15.4%  9.5% 
 
 
Public Health                                       3/25                 2/14                2/13                 2/21 
                  12.0%  14.3%  15.4%  9.5% 
 
Water/Agri                       1/1              7/25                 4/14                5/13                  5/21 
       100% 28.0%  28.6%  38.5%  23.8% 
 
 
Foreign Affairs                                    9/25                1/14                 2/13                 6/21 
     36.0%  7.1%  15.4%  28.6% 
 
Infrastructure                                       3/25                2/14                 4/13                 5/21 
     12.0%  14.3%  30.8%  23.8% 
 
Oil/Energy                                          2/25                4/14                2/13                  4/21  




i. Available Aló Presidente television program transcripts: Episode 367, Episode 366, Episode 365, Episode364, Episode 
363, Episode362, Episode 361, Episode 360, Episode 359, Episode 358, Episode 357, Episode 356, Episode 355, Episode 
353, Episode 352, Episode 351, Episode 350, Episode 349, Episode 348, Episode 347, Episode 346, Episode 345, 
Episode 344, Episode 343, Episode 342, Episode 341, Episode 339, Episode 338, Episode 334, Episode 331, Episode 
330, Episode 328, Episode 325, Episode 320, Episode 318, Episode 314, Episode 312, Episode 311, Episode 309, 
Episode 308, Episode 307, Episode 306, Episode 304, Episode 302, Episode 301, Episode 300, Episode 299, Episode 
298, Episode 297, Episode 296, Episode 295, Episode 291, Episode 290, Episode 289, Episode 288, Episode 286, 
Episode 285, Episode 284, Episode 283, Episode 282, Episode 281, Episode 280, Episode 279, Episode 278, Episode 
277, Episode 276, Episode 274, Episode 266, Episode 265, Episode 264, Episode 263, Episode 262 Maybe add years or 
something that will allow the reader to know how many episodes go into the analysis for each year column in Table 1 
ii. Several shows began with little evidence as to the overarching issues set to be discussed later in the program. These 
episodes have not been tabulated in any policy category but have been included in the total shows per year calculation to 
the right of the forward slash in the above chart. If the opening commentary and dialogue pertained to two or more issues, 
multiple issues are included in the above count. 
iii. Some posted transcripts were unreadable in their downloaded format, as such, they were not included in the above 
tabulation. 
iv. Chávez cannot be sure when his audience will be tuning in throughout his day-long programs. Shows were coded to 
the ~15th minute with the expectation that within the opening of the show is when Chávez is most likely to announce his 
major policy initiatives 
* 2006: Due to the suspension of the program for ~2 months prior to the legislative elections of 2006, only the preceding 
television program is coded for this year. 






Breaking down the data  
 
From Table 1, it is apparent that discussion of issues related to adequate water and to 
agriculture tend to dominate the major topic areas of opening dialogue in Aló Presidente, 
and that it does so for several years. This is an important signaling mechanism from Mr. 
Chávez to the Venezuelan people about where the interests of his government lie. Given 
the high rate of poverty prevalent in Venezuela, it is unsurprising that these staple issues 
would garner the most attention from the President in his outreach to his citizenry. 
 
The topic of Education17 has been relegated from 2008 to 2010 to single digit percentages. 
Garnering attention in 1/5 of the total episodes of the president’s coded opening dialogue 
following the legislative elections in 2006, in later years the topic of Education receives 
less than 10% of the total coded episodes. It has been usurped as a major topic of 
discussion on Aló Presidente by the policy area of Foreign Affairs in 2010, which has seen 
a large resurgence from a lull of attention in 2008 and 2009 when the global recession hit. 
Curiously, the resurgence of the topic of Foreign Affairs in Mr. Chávez’s dialogue to the 
Venezuelan people surrounding the 2010 legislative elections also correlates to the large 
amount of air time dedicated to Foreign Affairs immediately leading up to and following 
the 2006 legislative elections (represented by the 2007 data). This is not a coincidence and 
Mr. Chávez’s attention to the subject surrounding both legislative elections signals his 
willingness to play on anti-western sentiments that linger from the harsh, broadly 
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 Throughout my analyses of Aló Presidente, italics signify a specific policy area that was categorized in 





unpopular neoliberal policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
early nineties to maintain support for his government. Furthermore, his discussions of 
international partnerships with countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and Libya18 and 
dedication of show time to La Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de América 
(ALBA)19 as an alternative to the western backed Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) supports the notion that the Bolivarian Revolution is idealized to offer a divergent 
regional and world order from the western-backed, neoliberal market structure that 
dominates the world economy and geopolitics today. 
 
The topic of infrastructure has gained attention over the past three years. Rising from only 
12% of the coded episodes’ opening dialogue dedicated to the television program in 2007 
to nearly one quarter of episodes dedicated to the discussion of infrastructure development 
in Venezuela in 2010. Infrastructure programs discussed tended to focus on low-cost 
housing, passenger rail tracks linking populous cities, and the importance of the national 
oil company, PDVSA, in reinvesting oil profits into state-led public infrastructure 
spending.20 
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 Episodes 285, 283, 282, 343 discuss Iranian inputs of production and technology that are in use in 
Venezuelan socialist factories and cooperatives. Episode 365 contains focused discussion on Chinese 
company cooperation in developing passenger rail (as part of larger Plan Ferroviario Nacional). 
19
 Episodes 355, 353, 352, 349, 302, 266 all contain segmented discussions on the benefits of non-western 
partnership through the empowerment of Caribbean countries in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas 
(ALBA). 
20
 Episodes 365, 358, 328 discuss details and international partnerships involved in successfully 
implementing El Plan Ferrovario Nacional in laying national rail. Episode 343 and 276 discuss housing 
development for the impoverished, specifically Ciudad Camino de los Indios, socialist housing complex 
project for indigenous population. Episode 288 provides detailed discussion about the importance of 





Amongst major policy categories discussed on Aló Presidente, Public Health remains the 
most static category of discussion over time, with Health receiving discussion in, on 
average 12.8% of the coded opening show segments. This category is not as volatile as 
several other categories over time, only fluctuating to a low of 9.5% and high of 15.4% of 
episodes. Public Health is also unique as a major policy category in its likelihood with 
which the Missions programs are specifically mentioned and discussed at length by Mr. 
Chávez.21 By signaling out the Missions programs in his discussion of Public Health, 
Chávez is promoting government initiatives while attempting to reeducate the Venezuelan 
populace in the benefit of government sponsored socialist programs. 
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 Episodes 357, 341, 311, 296, 291, 277 all delve into the specifics and public benefits of Barrio Adentro and 
Mision Niño Jesús. Two public health facilities, el Centro Diagnóstico Integral and el Cardiológico Infantil, are 
also inaugurated on the show in a display on government action in combating public health issues. Episode 
334 is unique in its discussion of public health focusing predominantly on national production of diapers 
compared with privatized diaper production in the United States.  Specific attention is given to the disparity 
in diaper quality available to the children of the poor in the US diaper market as an example of segregated 





Marketing government initiatives: tabulating guest appearances on Aló 
Presidente 
 
To better our understanding of how President Chávez presents his social programs to the 
Venezuelan citizenry, I extracted tabulations of guest appearances over the past four years 
from the coded Aló Presidente transcripts. By examining the frequency and types of guests 
that Chávez is placing on his television program we can further our information about the 






Table 2: Aló Presidente Transcript Data – Brief discussion of President Chavez’s 
Philosophy 
 
Policy Area     2006* 2007  2008             2009          2010 
 
Education**                    5/25                1/14                1/13                  2/21 
 
 
Public Health                                       6/25                4/14                4/13                 2/21 
 
Water/Agri                         3/25                 5/14                6/13                  4/21  
 
 
Foreign Affairs                                    3/25                1/14                 2/13                 1/21 
 
Infrastructure                                       2/25                0/14                 0/13                 0/21 
 
Oil/Energy                                          1/25                2/14                 2/13                 1/21  
 




i. Sampling pool of available Aló Presidente television program transcripts: Episode 367, Episode 366, Episode 365, 
Episode364, Episode 363, Episode362, Episode 361, Episode 360, Episode 359, Episode 358, Episode 357, Episode 356, 
Episode 355, Episode 353, Episode 352, Episode 351, Episode 350, Episode 349, Episode 348, Episode 347, Episode 
346, Episode 345, Episode 344, Episode 343, Episode 342, Episode 341, Episode 339, Episode 338, Episode 334, 
Episode 331, Episode 330, Episode 328, Episode 325, Episode 320, Episode 318, Episode 314, Episode 312, Episode 
311, Episode 309, Episode 308, Episode 307, Episode 306, Episode 304, Episode 302, Episode 301, Episode 300, 
Episode 299, Episode 298, Episode 297, Episode 296, Episode 295, Episode 291, Episode 290, Episode 289, Episode 
288, Episode 286, Episode 285, Episode 284, Episode 283, Episode 282, Episode 281, Episode 280, Episode 279, 
Episode 278, Episode 277, Episode 276, Episode 274, Episode 266, Episode 265, Episode 264, Episode 263, Episode 262 
ii. Due to the unpredictability and often unscripted nature of the show, Chávez often freely discusses his current thoughts 
and feelings. It is common for fleeting thoughts of the president to be openly expressed. These comments were counted 
and categorized in the above table. Comments spanning the childhood of the president, the beguiling nature of capitalism, 
and religious allusions are all frequently made by the president. These comments will be explored below in the analysis 
of the side notes frequented by the president during Aló Presidente to provide a backdrop to the reader about the tone of 
the show. However, in categorizing the commentary, these comments are viewed as distinct from the brief commentary 
on major policy initiatives that the government is currently seeking to educate the people about. 
iii. If comments in the opening commentary and dialogue pertained to two or more issues, multiple issues are included in 
the above count. Thus, it is possible for a year’s total count of commentary to surpass the total number of shows. 
v. Some posted transcripts were unreadable in their downloaded format, as such, they were not included in the above 
tabulation. 
vi. Chávez cannot be sure when his audience will be tuning in throughout his day-long programs. Shows were coded to 
the ~15th minute with the expectation that within the opening of the show is when Chávez is most likely to announce his 
major policy initiatives 
* 2006: Due to the suspension of the program for ~2 months prior to the legislative elections of 2006, only the preceding 
television program is coded for this year. 
** Since we read Alo Presidente as a tool whereby Chavez expects to educate the populace on socialist philosophy and 
government initiatives, we must explicitly state what comments do and do not qualify under the Policy Area of Education 
when coding for minor discussions. In this table, only comments pertaining to the Educational system of Venezuela were 
counted and categorized under Education. Comments pertaining to the socialization of the Venezuelan citizenry into the 





Across the top of Table 2 guests are categorized according to the titles given to them in the 
show transcripts. Rows indicate the major policy areas tabulated in Table 1 and indicate 
the policy areas with which the guests were associated.  
 
Government officials are broken down into six categories: Military, Ministers, Governors, 
Mayors, Police, and Others. Mayors tend to be introduced briefly in passing, however, at 
times mayors discuss local matters with the president. Governors too tend to be relegated 
minimal time on the show because the show is mainly devoted to personal and regional 
conversation. Thus, these officials as a whole add relatively little to the discussion of 
advancing Chavez’s policy initiatives. However, the frequency with which these local 
officials appear on the program, supports the idea that Chavez is attempting to appear 
receptive and in touch with the local issues concerning the common people. The Other 
subcategory of Government officials furthers this idea due to the relatively frequent 
occurrence of these individuals and the large number of communal council members who 
make-up this subsection. 
 
Perhaps, most important to our analysis of Table 2 is the subcolumn, Ministers. Ministers 
are appointed by the President to serve a specified purpose as the Government’s manager 
in a specific policy area. From the data, it is apparent that ministers from ministries, whose 
policy purview includes water and agricultural production, tend to receive the most 
acknowledgements from President Chavez in the opening of Aló Presidente. Frequently, 





President. By Chavez hand-picking these individuals out of his government to talk about in 
front of the camera, he is sending a clear message about which ministries his government 
gives priority. 
 
The large number of show guests who are manual worker in agricultural employment also 
reaffirms this stance that agriculture remains Chavez’s main selling point for government 
initiatives. We expect too that men manual laborers would outnumber women workers. 
However, the large inequitable distribution of men in relation to women agricultural 
workers is surprising, given the representativeness that the Bolivarian Constitution 
guarantees, suggesting that the idea of gender quality at this time remains largely 
rhetorical. Male guests not only dominate the representation of agricultural fields of 
employment on the program but also the Oil/Energy sector, as well, leading us to suspect 
that Chávez is consciously marketing himself in this manner. It is notable, however, that 





women have long been more acceptable, as those are issues that have a stereotypically 
‘feminine’ policy domain, and are often where women are best represented in government. 
 
Quantifying philosophizing during Aló Presidente 
 
Table 3 focuses on comments made by the President in regards to the Major Policy areas 
that were categorized in Table 1. Unlike the show themes explored in Table 1, however, 
this commentary did not develop into a full discussion in the opening  ~15 minutes of the 
show, was and instead appears to be brief signals about the President’s philosohy. 
Government propaganda not related to the major six policy areas was not categorized in 
the table (with the exception of Religion) due to the frequent commentary by the President 
that does not directly relate to the television show’s main policy theme. By examining this 
data, we are able to better establish our understanding of which policy areas Chavez has 










From examination of Table 3 we see that brief philosophy statements related to the topic of 
Water/Agriculture tend to dominate discussion over time. Similar to our analysis of Table 
1, we find that the President’s attention to Education has diminished over time, while brief 
philosophy statements related to Public Health too have decreased. It is important to note 
that philosophizing in general decreased in 2010. Perhaps, Aló has become more structured 
in nature. The increase in brief philosophy statements about religion by the president over 
the past four years is also interesting to note. The greater use of religious speech present in 
Aló during the national legislative election year of 2010, suggests that Chávez may be 
more inclined to pander to the religious sentiments of his Venezuelan constituency. 
 
Evaluating public support for majority policy areas discussed in Aló Presidente 
 
In this section, we cross-analyze the coded Aló Presidente policy areas’ discussion data 
with popular support data from Latinobarómetro, the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP), and Datanalisis. In utilizing this data and understanding the perceived 
successes and shortcomings of the Mission Programs over time by the Venezuelan people, 
we are able to understand the impact of Chávez’s attempted socialization of the 
Venezuelan populace through the exposure of public policy discussion in the media, 
specifically the attempted reeducation of the Venezuelan populace through Mr. Chávez’s 
socialist message conveyed in our coded Aló Presidente transcript data found in Table 1. 
Mainly, we can begin to answer the question: How well has Chávez succeeded in selling 





 Based on the findings of the analysis of discussion of Major Policy areas covered on Aló 
Presidente , which is our proxy for the topics Mr. Chávez has chosen to expend his time 
promoting, I expect that data from Latinobarómetro and Datanalisis will reflect positive 
changes over time in categories concerning major policy areas of Infrastructure, Oil and 
Energy, and Foreign Affairs partnerships. Given the large percentage of show time across 
our Aló Presidente sampling allocated to selling government initiatives on divisive 
Water/Agriculture issues, I expect that polling concerning agriculture production will have 
very favorably increased over the past half decade.   
 I use public opinion survey data to measure Venezuelan’s attitudes toward specific 
Misiones and policy areas.  To minimize the impact of skewed data (whether due to 
political reasons or poor sampling practice), I use survey data from several sources. Due to 
the resource limitations and potential for politicization of local firms, it becomes 
imperative that objective regional and internationally collected data also be utilized. This is 
especially the case in Venezuela, where (over the past ten years) Venezuelan society has 
become as polarized as its politics. Comparing public opinion data gathered by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), with data from Latinobarómetro both of 
which are scholarly, international public opinion data gathering projects, and Datanalisis 
that is widely regarded as the most reputable local polling firm within Venezuela22, allows 
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 Datanálisis has been referenced in the weekly periodical, The Economist: 2009.  “Chavez for ever?”, as 
well as, the independent website, venezuelanalysis.com. 2009. in “Polls Show Economic Optimism and 





for the most careful representation of public opinion available. By incorporating these 
three, generally well-regarded data sources, I ensure that criticism of the objectivity of one 
firm does not take away from the credibility of the analysis.  
 
Years covered by the surveys vary across each source, but each source offers relevant data 
overlapping with the Aló Presidente transcript years coded. LAPOP data coming from the 
Venezuela country surveys of 2007, 2008, and 2010 aid in our discussion of the 
availability, acceptance, and quality of the Mission Programs that Chávez has espoused on 
his television program. Relevant data from regional Latinobarómetro surveys covering 
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 further contextualize the success by which Mr. Chávez has 
been able to socialize Venezuelans into accepting the Mission Programs, which act as the 
foundational socialist pillars of Socialismo del Siglo XXI. Finally, local survey data from 
Datanalisis covering the tenure of Chávez’s presidency provides local polling firm 
findings about Venezuelan preferences for the Mission Programs.  
 
Chávez appears to have had success selling his Foreign Affairs initiatives to the 
Venezuelan people. Given the large amount of time in the introductory segment of Aló 
Presidente dedicated to promoting international partnerships and undercutting western 
liberal democracy and capitalism this is unsurprising. A poll by Latinobarómetro in 2009 





ALBA.23 Indeed, data taken from the 2007 Latinobarómetro survey also hint at a favorable 
foreign affairs approval from the Venezuelan people with 62.5% of all Venezuelans 
approving of the job of the government in handling foreign relations (LAPOP 2007).24 
 
The popularity of government funded Education initiatives holds up slightly less well. In 
2009, 58.9% of Venezuelans approved of government funded education with 16.2% of 
Venezuelans responding “Not satisfied at all” about the functioning of government 
sponsored education initiatives (LAPOP 2009). From 2007 to 2010, we see less than a 2% 
rise in participation at Mision Ribas, an education Mission geared towards educating 
Venezuela’s more than five million high school dropouts, from 9.29% to 10.93% of 
Venezuelans saying they have made use of the free Mission services. This relative lack of 
positive response by the Venezuelan people to government sponsored education reforms 
versus foreign affairs initiatives by the government correlates with the marginal discussion 
of Education reforms on Aló vs. the great amount of show time devoted to foreign affairs. 
It is also possible that foreign affairs are largely abstract for citizens. Thus, merely bashing 
the US may be favorably received by the Venezuelan people, while education is a concrete 
policy area that people actually use, and thus they have a more concrete basis for 
evaluating it. 
In Public Health too Chávez appears to be getting his message across to the Venezuelan 
citizenry with nearly 90% of respondents to Latinobarómetro’s annual 2008 survey self-
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 A favorable rating being 6 or higher on Latinobarómetro 2009 : Please rate the institutions below from 1 








reporting that “Healthcare” should be mainly in the hands of the Government.
25 In 2010, 
Mission Barrio Adentro, a Bolivarian social mission devoted to promoting publicly funded 
health and dental care to Venezuelans, was frequented by nearly half of the population 
according to the Latin American Public Opinion Project.26 
 
Water/Agriculture discussion tended to dominate the major show themes and 
philosophizing of the President during the past four years of coded Aló Presidente 
transcripts. How well has Chávez succeeded in selling these programs? In 2010, 
MERCAL, the government sponsored chain that supplies subsidized food and other goods 
at affordable prices, was used by 63.17% of Venezuelans (LAPOP 2010). Reports from 
Datanalisis and covered in the periodical, El Universal, confirm the positive spike in usage 
of Mission MERCAL reflected in the LAPOP data, with a recorded 13% spike in usage 
from 2005 to 2006 alone (EL Universal 2006).27 
 
The concern expressed by Chavez for Infrastructure development has rapidly grown to 
consume more show time during 2009 and 2010 than the prior years of our coded Aló 
transcripts. This could be in part due to what the Economist Intelligence Unit noted in it’s 
2008 study, rating Venezuela infrastructure a C due to concerns that infrastructure has 
“deteriorated in recent decades because of underinvestment, stemming from a lack of 
effective administrative capacity and a decline in fiscal revenue. In an attempt to reverse 
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 “De la lista de actividades le voy a leer Cuáles cree Ud.  Que deben estar mayoritariamente en manos del 
estado y cuales deben estar mayoritariamente en manos privadas? La Salud. 
26
 46.72% of respondants self-reporting to have utilized the Mission in the past twelve months. LAPOP 2010 
27





the decline, the government has decided to dedicate a portion of windfall oil revenue to 
infrastructure” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008).28 
 
The spike in 2010 in discussion concerning Oil/Energy on Aló is understandable given the 
findings of a 2010 study by Datanalisis, whereby nearly 80% of the population say they 
are affected by the problem of electricity shortages.29 Ironically, during Episode 341 of Aló 
Presidente (October 4, 2009), the President was embarrassed by an electricity gaffe in the 
program opening, which may have led to greater awareness on the part of the President 
about the need to speak out about government initiatives to combat electricity shortages. 
The government’s handling of Venezuela’s vast petroleum reserves and the volatility of oil 
prices over the past decade has also not sat well with Venezuelans, with 50.8% of 
Latinobarómetro respondents in 2008 reporting to be dissatisfied with the manner in which 
the Government is facing rising oil prices. Given the instability of world markets during 
the end of 2008 and the dissatisfaction on the part of Venezuelans with the handling of the 
situation by the government, it follows that we would expect the jump in program 
discussion allotted to Oil/Energy from 2007 to 2008. 
Sometimes the arrow seems to go from discussion by Chávez on Aló Presidente to public 
approval, and sometimes the arrow seems to go the other way, with public (dis)approval 
possibly being a prompt for Pres. Chavez to pay more attention to an issue.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The expansive political, social, and economic change over the past decade in Venezuela 
makes it important for political scientists and policymakers to understand how Chávez has 
sold his ‘revolution’ to the Venezuelan citizenry. President Hugo Chávez, having 
embraced visual and social media outlets (television, radio, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) as a 
way of conveying his message to the masses has become arguably one of the most 
publically exposed jefes del estado in the world. By understanding the context of Chávez’s 
exposure in the media, specifically, by evaluating his weekly show, Aló Presidente, we 
gain insight into the ways that Chávez has managed to maintain power through 
democratically legitimate means. Furthermore, by exploring the different policy areas that 
Chávez is most likely to discuss on his show, we gain a better understanding about how 
President Chávez is trying to socialize the Venezuelan populace in his Bolivarian ideology. 
The findings of this research suggest that Hugo Chávez appears to be well attuned to the 
complaints of the Venezuelan citizenry.  His responsiveness in Aló Presidente -- answering 
questions and explaining government programs aimed at the perceived shortcomings of his 
government -- may have helped enable Chávez to maintain broad support for himself and 
his PSUV over the past decade. The ability of the government to market social causes and 
programs that it supports is a possibly important explanatory factor in understanding how 
Chávez has managed to stay in power through democratic means for over a decade, even 





importance of the topics of Foreign Affairs, Water/Agriculture, and Infrastructure in how 
Hugo Chávez is marketing himself to his constituents. Data concerning the presentation of 
guests on the show also alludes to the important roles that Ministers play in marketing 
Chávez’s policy initiatives, with airtime frequently allocated to Ministers related to 
Water/Agriculture issues. Data about how the President uses his television show to express 
his philosophy to Venezuelans suggest that religiosity has become a greater selling point in 
more recent years. This could possibly be attributed to the perceived shortcomings within 
the administration’s implementation of its policy agenda, or the socialist agenda, itself. The 
data presented here also further our understanding of the importance placed on 
Water/Agriculture issues by Mr. Hugo Chávez when trying to relate government initiatives 
directly to the Venezuelan people. The fact that Chávez has relied on these staple issues as 
a fallback for garnering support from the Venezuelan citizenry should not altogether 
surprise us, especially, when viewed in light of the guests that have appeared on the show. 
 
This paper studied the marketing of government programs and presentation of philosophy 
about major policy areas in accordance with Bolivarian ideology on Aló Presidente.  This 
analysis of one of the ways President Chavez uses the media indicates that it would also be 
interesting to study the other types of social media utilized by President Chavez, 
especially, given the recent wave of democratic uprisings across the Middle East 
associated with the use of social media. Could Mr. Chávez’s usage and wide following 
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